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This research extends simple two-sector models in order to inquire the impact 
of the extent of coverage or enforcement of minimum wage legislation in one of the 
sectors on the equilibrium outcome. 
Two versions of institutional wage avoidance are presented. They may be seen 
as representing different institutional detection rules: one working through worker 
complaint, the other through firm sampling inspection (and enforcement) by the legal 
system. Both cases are modelled as enlargements of two dualistic models: Harris-
Todaro (the wage in the other sector is market determined) and Bhagwati-Hamada (the 
wage in the other sector is institutionally fixed and coverage is complete).  
Impact on population flows of changes in degree of coverage (compliance) is 
also confronted with the effect of a change in the institutional wage for each scenario. 
 
 
JEL: O15, O17, O18, R23, J38, J42, J61, J62, F22, K42. 
Keywords: Migration, Mobility, Minimum Wages, Segmented Labor  
  Markets, Informal Sector, Regional Labor Markets, Dualistic Models,  
Coverage.  
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One of the landmarks in the analysis of institutionally set wages is the Harris-
Todaro model. The rationale behind it applies to a wide range of economic problems, 
whenever an artificial wage floor – higher than what the market would determine – 
affects (at least) one of two (or more) communicating labor markets. The scenario 
emerges when minimum wage laws are being practiced, whether they are legitimated 
by general state legislation or coerced in unionized sectors. 
Traditional dualistic models 1 consider that in each sector either coverage is 
complete - or completely enforced - or it is totally absent. This was the framework 
considered by Todaro (1969) and Harris-Todaro (1970) - in which the wage in the rural 
sector is market determined. And by Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) - in which both 
sectors are subject to institutional rules, yet with different wage levels.  
In the subsequent literature, degree of mobility across sectors was added to the 
framework, modelled in various ways - as in Mincer (1976), MacDonald and Solow 
(1985), Fields (1989) or, in general, in Martins (2008). These models yield equilibrium 
corner solutions which alternate between those cases and other outcomes, some with no 
unemployment 2. Another way of enlarging the scope of the dualistic approach is to 
allow coverage to be incomplete in one of the sectors, due to illegal evasion, or to the 
existence of only partial unionisation in that sector. This is the aim of the present 
research. The issue is more relevant to economies which have a large uncovered sector, 
i.e., a lot of illegal immigrants willing to work for less than the minimum wage or when 
the economy is in a downturn and the number of sub-minimum workers is expected to 
increase. From a policy perspective, the paper analyses the consequences of minimum 
wage law enforcement on labor market outcomes. 
                                           
1 See Martins (1996) for a survey of some analytical implications of similar structures to the 
ones considered. 
2 See Martins (1996) for a summary.  
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Theoretical approaches that have dealt with the problem of the existence of an 
informal sector - for example Bental, Ben-Zion and Wenig (1985), Ginsburgh, Michel, 
Schioppa and Pestieau (1985) and De Gijsel (1985) - consider scenarios where illegal 
behavior is oriented towards tax evasion and not necessarily minimum wage legislation 
avoidance, and/or are concerned with implications for standard macroeconomic policy 
effectiveness, or law enforcement measures.  
In the Harris-Todaro (H.-T.) approach, we could argue that the size of the 
informal sector is implicitly fixed by the rural sector labor demand. Instead, we allow 
for coexistence of formal and informal jobs in one of the sectors - which we will call 
the partially covered sector, the first sector - and insert a parameter that will represent 
the degree of law enforcement of the institutional minimum wage in that sector or 
region. Compliance with minimum wage legislation by the firm was modelled by 
Ashenfelter and Smith (1979), Grenier (1982) and Chang and Ehrlich (1985); these 
authors address the problem of how the incentives for the firm to comply change with 
penalties and the probability of detection; with reference to these, we model a scenario 
where degree of law enforcement or coverage corresponds to (their) probability of 
detection, being the penalty the full payment of extra income needed to attain the 
minimum wage. 
Jones (1987) presents a dualistic model where efficiency wages in the primary 
sector create unemployment in that sector; he then introduces minimum wage 
legislation affecting the low wage, secondary sector and analyses the consequences of 
partial compliance; unemployment is generated in the primary sector and not in the 
secondary (partially covered) sector. Instead, we focus on the effects of non-
compliance in scenarios of institutionally set wages (e.g., unionized sectors). 
Hence, we put forward two versions of the stochastic dynamics of expected 
wage formation in the partially covered sector; the two equilibrium definitions yield the 
same extreme point results (i.e., the cases where there is no enforcement at all and 
where there is total enforcement respectively), but we can interpret the second type as 
applying to a higher degree of segregation between formal and informal employment in 
the partially covered sector. The first case could correspond to a situation where 
workers are inspected or detection comes from workers' complaints; in the second case, 
firms are inspected by the legal system and once caught they must straighten up all 
their wage payments, but may adjust their employment decisions. 
Two kinds of dualistic situations are considered - one in which the second 
sector is completely informal (in H.-T. lines); another in which the second sector is 
subject to institutional wage setting, eventually different from the first sector's, and  
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where coverage or law enforcement is complete (as in Bhagwati and Hamada, B.-H., 
approach). With the two kinds of equilibrium, this implies that we establish four 
different models. 
In each of the structures, we analyze the impact of the change of the degree of 
coverage or of law enforcement on population flows, mean wage in the partially 
covered sector, equilibrium expected wage, total unemployment, local or sector 
unemployment and unemployment rates, wage and/or wage bills. 
Finally, we inquire whether increasing the degree of law enforcement acts on 
population flows similarly to rising the institutional wage in the several structures. 
Our analysis is kept very simple - applying to the general long-run labor 
market equilibrium assessment of two sectors or two geographic areas. Degree of law 
enforcement is exogenous and acts directly on wage payment practices. We only 
consider one homogeneous input, labor, and ignore complications from detection 
and/or penalties of infractors. Search issues are discarded as well.  
In section II, two versions of partial coverage dynamics in a dualistic scenario 
are presented, being the first sector the one where coverage is incomplete; requirements 
for internal solutions when the second sector is either completely covered by 
institutional wage setting rules or completely uncovered are also inspected. In section 
III, implications of a change in the degree of coverage in the first sector are analyzed in 
a setting where the wage in the second sector is market determined (i.e., in H.-T. 
tradition); both versions of partial coverage modelling are studied; the impact of a 
change in the partially covered sector institutional wage is also confronted with the 
impact of the change of the degree of coverage. Section IV reproduces the comparative 
statics of section III but for a scenario where the second sector wage is institutionally 
determined (i.e., in B.-H. type of model). In section V, we discuss possible extensions, 
namely of workers being expected utility rather than expected income maximizers. The 
exposition ends with a brief summary in section VI.   
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II. Partial One-Sector Coverage in Dualistic Models. 
 
This section translates general notation and briefly presents the benchmark 
dualistic models enlarged by the research – sub-section i.  
The two alternative extensions that simulate partial coverage - the existence of 
an informal sector within a covered region –, Type A and Type B, are forwarded in 
sub-sections ii and iii respectively. The general dynamic mechanism is stated, followed 
by the corresponding equilibrium condition, with qualifications of the possible wage 
range of the different employment status. In sub-section iv, some comments to the two 
structures are advanced. 
 
i. Notation and Environment 
 
1. Let us start by the usual assumption in the two-sector minimum wage 
model. There are two sectors - or two regions - and a fixed exogenous labor supply, L;
_
. This total labor supply decides whether to go into sector 1 or 2. Denote by L;
_
i 
local/industry supply in region/sector i. Then: 
 
(1)   L;
_






In sector i, the aggregate demand function is given by: 
 
(2)   Li  =  Li(Wi)    ,   i = 1, 2 
 
A non-positive slope – that is, Li(Wi)’ = dLi(Wi)/dWi   0 – is always 
assumed. Denote the corresponding inverse demand function by: 
 
(3)   Wi  =  Wi(Li)    ,   i = 1, 2 
 
The wage elasticity of demand of sector i at a particular point of labor demand 
will be denoted by  i = Li(Wi)' Wi / Li(Wi) = Wi(Li) / [Wi(Li)' Li]. 
  
- 8 - 
2. Effective employment in region 2 will obey its demand function, 
L2
e = L2 = L2(W2). In sector 1, where coverage is incomplete, employment, L1
e, may 
differ from demand. Unemployment in region i will be defined as 
 
(4)   Ui =  L;
_
i  - Li
e   
 
with total unemployment in the economy being: 
 
(5)   U  =  U1 + U2  =  L;
_
 - (L1
e + L2) 
 
and local unemployment rate: 
 
(6)   ui = Ui / L;
_
i   
 
3. Assume further that: 
 
1. individuals are risk neutral and maximize expected income. 
2. job rotation is accomplished locally or within the industry. 
3. wage in sector 1 is partially determined by market conditions. 
4.a. wage in sector 2 is market determined (H.-T. type);  alternatively:  
4.b. wage in sector 2 is institutionally determined and coverage is complete 
(B.-H type). 
5. local/industry labor demand depends negatively on its argument. There are 
no cross effects, i.e., dLi/dWj = 0 for ij. 
 
When 4.a. is assumed, a generalization of the Harris-Todaro model is 
considered. When 4.b. is assumed, we consider a generalization of the Bhagwati-
Hamada model. 
 
4. We can model partial coverage in several ways. Let us consider two 
solutions or versions of equilibrium dynamics which will be denoted Type - A and 
Type - B respectively: 
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ii. Partial Coverage Equilibrium: Type - A. 
 
1. Assume that the dynamics of the model are described by the tree below (I 










L  / L
1
L  / L
2
L (W ) 2
2
L2
L (W ) 1 1
L1
1 -
L (W ) 1 1
L1 
1 - 
Covered Job, W 1
Uncovered Job,
W (L ) 1
1
1 -






Consider that we have assumption 4.a. Individuals can go to sector 2 and earn 
wage W2, which will go down till U2 = 0. Expected wage in sector 2 will be: 
 
(7)   W2
e = W2 =  W2(L;
_
2)  
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If an individual chooses to go to sector 1, he may find employment, but of the 
available jobs, only a proportion  pay the institutional wage, W1, with the other (1 - ) 
paying the marginal product of the total population in sector 1. Average wage in sector 
1 will be: 
 
(8)    
_




Technically, condition (8) implies that wages in uncovered jobs of sector 1 
only partially obey market conditions, not being driven down till no unemployment is 
generated in the economy. It can be justified by the existence of real world frictions 
such as ex-ante uncertainty about the accepted job type and implied time loss from 
switching jobs, more costly in sector 1 where there are more alternatives. 
And employment in sector 1 will obey demand: 
 
(9)   L1
e =  L1 =  L1[ W1 + (1 - ) W1(L;
_




Notice that being 
_
;W1 a weighted average of W1 and W1(L;
_
1) - and for the 
institutional wage to be binding W1(L;
_
1) < W1 -, we must have: 
 
(10)   W1(L;
_
1)  <  
_




(11)   L1(W1)  <  L1
e =  L1(
_




Expected wage in sector 1 will be: 
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(12)         W1
e = [ W1 + (1 - ) W1(L;
_







and the wage bill is  
_
;W1 L1[ W1 + (1 - ) W1(L;
_





Internal solutions will require equalization of expected wages across sectors 
and, thus: 
 
(13) [ W1 + (1 - ) W1(L;
_














which solves for L;
_




;W1 (1 - u1)  =  W2  
 
2. If  = 0, the model will yield the free market solution, i.e., the one for which 
W* obeys: 
 




If  = 1, the model will yield the Harris-Todaro solution, i.e., the one for 
which W2 is such that: 
 
(16)   W1 L1(W1) / [L;
_
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(17)   W1 L1(W1) / L;
_
1 =  W2(L;
_






3. In the internal solution of the general model, it must be the case that: 
 
(18)       W1  >  W*    
 
or the wage restriction is not binding. And 
 
(19)    
_
;W1 =  W1 + (1 - ) W1(L;
_




;W1 may be larger (if 
_
;W1 / > 0) or smaller (if 
_
;W1 / < 0) 
than W*. Also, W2 may be larger or smaller than W*; and it may be larger or smaller 
than W1(L;
_
1), i.e., we can have either: 
 
(20)   W1  >   
_
;W1  >  W1(L;
_




(21)   W1  >   
_
;W1  >  W2  >  W1(L;
_
1)   
 
 
Proposition 1: With incomplete coverage in one sector and a completely  
  uncovered sector and the internal equilibrium solutions described by: 
 [  W1 + (1 - ) W1(L;
_










  it must be the case that: 
  .   W1  >  
_
;W1  >  W1(L;
_
1)  >  W2 
 Or  
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  .   W1  >  
_
;W1  >  W2  >  W1(L;
_
1)   
 
Of course, the expected value of the wage is equalized across sectors 1 and 2, 
but to have a chance at the high wage W1, an individual must also risk ending up with 
– or rotatively get also - W1(L;
_
1). With the described equilibrium, this informal wage 
of the covered sector may fall below the wage of the uncovered sector itself. 
 
4. If we have institutional wage in sector 2 but with complete law enforcement 
in this sector, expected wage in sector 2 will be: 
 
(22)   W2




Then, the equilibrium condition becomes: 
 
(23)   [ W1 + (1 - ) W1(L;
_




1 =   
    =   W 2 L2(W2) / L;
_






which solves for  L;
_
1. In equilibrium, 
 
(24)    
_
;W1 (1 - u1) = W2  (1 - u2) 
 
If  = 0, the model will yield the Harris-Todaro solution, i.e., the one for which 
W1 is such that: 
 
(25)   W2 L2(W2)  / L;
_








If   = 1, the model will yield the Bhagwati-Hamada solution, i.e., 
  
- 14 - 
(26)   W1 L1(W1) / L;
_




We can look at the equilibrium solution as if the left hand-side was a weighted 










1. As W1 > W1(L;
_
1), 
then it must be the case that: 
 






1  <  W2 L2(W2) / L;
_













1 <  L2(W2) 
/ L;
_






(28)   W1(L;
_






1]  <  W1  
 






1] > 1. Then  
 






1] <  W1  
 
Consider now that 
_





1 >  L2(W2) / L;
_


























1] / [L2(W2) / L;
_
2] > 1. Then  
 
(31)     W1(L;
_






1] / [L2(W2) / L;
_
2]  <  
W2  
 
Therefore, we can now have two possibilities for the internal solution: 
If  W2 > W1: 
 




1) ,   L2(W2) / L;
_





and  u2 > u1 
 
If, W2 < W1, then, either: 
 




1) ,  L2(W2)/ L;
_




1  and   




(34)  W1 >  
_
;W1 > W2  > W1(L;
_
1),  L2(W2)/ L;
_




1  and   








1)  >  W2,  L2(W2)/ L;
_




1  and   
u2 < u1 
 
With global coverage, i.e., W1 =  W2  = W,  it must be the case that 
 
(36)       W   >  
_
;W1  > W1(L;
_
1) ,   L2(W)/ L;
_




1  and   
u2 > u1  
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Proposition 2: With incomplete coverage in one sector and a completely  
  covered sector and the internal equilibrium solutions described by: 
 [  W1 + (1 - ) W1(L;
_




1 =  





  2.1. In general: 
  . If  W2 > W1, then: 




1) ,   L2(W2) / L;
_




1  and   
u2 > u1 
  . If W2 < W1, then, either: 




1) ,  L2(W2)/ L;
_




1  and   
u2 > u1 
 or 
 W 1 > 
_
;W1 > W2  > W1(L;
_
1),  L2(W2)/ L;
_




1  and   
u2 < u1 
 or 




1)  >  W2,  L2(W2)/ L;
_




1  and   
u2 < u1 
  2.2. If  W2 = W1 = W: 
  W   >  
_
;W1  > W1(L;
_
1) ,   L2(W)/ L;
_




1  and   u2 > 
u1 
 
With both sectors being covered, if the institutional wage in the partially 
informal sector is not higher than in the other, the informal jobs’ wage will fall below 
both. But if the opposite occurs, dependent on demands and on the relative distance 
between the institutional wages, a variety of relative magnitudes – as well as of the 
local unemployment rates – are compatible with (a unique) equilibrium. 
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iii. Partial Coverage Equilibrium: Type - B. 
 
1. We can consider, instead of (8) and (9), that a proportion  of first sector 
firms pays the institutional wage, employing people in accordance, and a proportion 1 - 
 of the firms pay the marginal product of applicants, in such a way that dynamics may 











L  / L 1
L  / L
2
L (W ) 2
2
L2




Covered Job, W 1
Uncovered Job,
W (L ) 1
1
1 -








Then, it is as if  represented the proportion of unionized firms in sector 1. 
Employment in sector 1 will be:  
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(37)   L1




Of course, the institutional wage coverage in the first sector will only be 
relevant if:  
 
(38)   W1(L;
_
1) < W1 
 
Expected wage in sector 1 will be: 
 
(39)   W1
e =   W1 L1(W1) / L;
_
1 +  (1 - ) W1(L;
_
1)    
 
The wage bill in sector 1 is: 
 






From (37), we will observe in an interior solution that: 
 
(41)   L1(W1)  <  L1




The average wage paid to people employed in sector 1 will be: 
 
(42)    
_














Then, we can look at 
_
;W1 as a weighted average of W1 and W1(L;
_
1) with 
weights  L1(W1) / L1
e and (1 -  ) L;
_
1 / L1
e (that sum 1). Then:  
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(43)   W1(L;
_
1)  <  
_
;W1  <  W1 
 
2. Consider that in sector 2 the wage is market determined. Equalization of 
expected wage in both sectors will yield the equilibrium condition: 
 
(44)    W1 L1(W1) / L;
_











When  = 0, the model reproduces the free market (with no unemployment) 
equilibrium condition. When  = 1, we have the Harris-Todaro model.  
Looking at (44), in the interior solution W2(L;
_





1). Then, either: 
 




2) < W1 L1(W1)/ L;
_












This second case occurs when the institutional wage in the first sector is very 
high and L1(W1) / L;
_
1 is low.  
For infinitesimal increases of W1 around the unconstrained equilibrium, 
W1(L;
_






1 >(<) W1 L1(W1); as W1 is set at 
a higher level than W1(L;
_
1), that is expected to occur for a wage elasticity of demand  
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1] > (<) 1. 
 
Proposition 3: With incomplete coverage in one sector and a completely  
  uncovered sector and the internal equilibrium solutions described by: 
       W1 L1(W1) / L;
_









  we may have either that: 




2) < W1 L1(W1)/ L;
_
1 < W1, expected if | 1 | < 1 
 Or 




2) > W1 L1(W1) / L;
_
1, expected if | 1 | > 
1 
 
Interestingly, the possibilities differ from those of the equilibrium of Type – 
A. Now, the informal wage may be below that of the totally uncovered sector, but, in 
the opposite extreme, the expected value of the covered job wage may fall below all of 
the other employment situations. 
 
3. Take now the case where sector 2 is subject to institutional rules. Then, the 
equilibrium condition becomes: 
 
(47)    W1 L1(W1) / L;
_
1 +  (1 - ) W1(L;
_




When  = 0, the model reproduces the Harris-Todaro equilibrium condition. 
When  = 1, we have the Bhagwati-Hamada model.  may be interpreted as the degree 
of coverage in sector 1. Equilibrium expected wage in the economy is the expected 
wage in sector 2. 
In the optimal solution, it must be the case that:  
 
(48)   W1(L;
_
1)  <  W1  
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for an interior solution to be observed - otherwise the institutional rule is not 
binding in the first sector. Given (47), in the optimal interior solution, the expected 
wage in the completely covered sector, 2 - and in the economy -, will lie between 




1) - because it is a weighted average of the two -, but 
W1 L1(W1) / L;
_
1 may be larger or smaller than W1(L;
_
1). That is, we may have that 
in the optimal solution either: 
 
(49)   W1(L;
_
1) < W2 L2(W2) / L;
_
2 < W1 L1(W1) / L;
_
1 < W1  
 
and it must be the case that  
 
(50)   W1(L;
_
1) < W2. 
Or, 
(51)   W1  >  W1(L;
_
1) > W2 L2(W2) / L;
_










This second case occurs when the wage in the first sector is very high and 
L1(W1)/ L;
_
1 is low. 
One can see that both situations are consistent with (47) and (48), and with 
W2 larger or smaller than W1. 
 
Homogeneous coverage will guarantee W1 = W2 = W. The equilibrium 
condition becomes: 
 
(53)    W L1(W) / L;
_
1 + (1 -  ) W1(L;
_
1) =  W L2(W) / L;
_
2   
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In this case, due to (48), it will always be the case that 
 
(54)    W  >  W;
_
1     
 
and therefore, from (53) 
 
(55)   L2(W) / L;
_
2  <  L1
e / L;
_
1     or      u2 > u1 
 
Again, we may have, either of the two cases (49) and (51): either (49) holds 
 
(56)   W1(L;
_
1)  <  W L2(W) / L;
_
2  <  W L1(W) / L;
_
1  <  W  
 
and, then, necessarily, using (55): 
 
(57)   L2(W) / L;
_
2  <  L1(W) / L;
_





Or (51) holds: 
 
(58)  W  >  W1(L;
_
1)  >  W L2(W) / L;
_




which implies, with (55) that: 
 
(59)   L1
e / L;
_
1  >  L2(W) / L;
_





Proposition 4: With incomplete coverage in one sector and a completely  
  covered sector and the internal equilibrium solutions described by: 
    W1 L1(W1) / L;
_
1 +  (1 - ) W1(L;
_
1)  =  W2 L2(W2)/ L;
_
2 
  4.1. In the general case, we may have either that:  
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  . W1(L;
_
1) < W2 L2(W2)/ L;
_
2 < W1 L1(W1)/ L;
_
1 < W1 and W1(L;
_
1) < W2 
 Or 










  4.2. If  W2 = W1 = W, either: 
  . W1(L;
_
1) < W L2(W) / L;
_
2 < W L1(W) / L;
_
1 < W      and, then 
    L 2(W) / L;
_
2 <  L1(W) / L;
_





  . W > W1(L;
_
1) > W L2(W) / L;
_
2 > W L1(W) / L;
_
1      and, then 
    L 1
e / L;
_
1  >  L2(W) / L;
_




With both sectors subject to some fixed wage regulation, in the new 
equilibrium, W1(L;
_
1) may be below or above the expected value of earnings in the 
completely covered sector – and, but not simultaneously, of the expected wage of a 




iv. Some Comments to the Two Structures, Type - A and Type - B. 
 
. The two structures are such that corner values for  yield, respectively, the 
free market wage (when  = 0) and the expected wage in a completely covered sector 
(when    =  1) for the expected wage in sector 1. However, they originate different 
features of the equilibrium outcome. Looking at the equilibrium conditions and 
expected wage formation according to each decision tree, we can interpret the 
applicability of either scenario as follows: 
In Type-A dynamics, the same firm would hire individuals both at the 
institutional wage (in a proportion ) and at the implied free market wage that would  
- 24 - 
accommodate all population in sector 1 (in a proportion 1 - ); therefore demand in the 
partially covered sector is a function of average wage. 
Type-B would be more consistent with a higher degree of segregation between 
formal and informal firms. The formal firms, in a proportion  of the economy, would 
respond according to the labor demand argument that they face, the institutional wage; 
the informal firms would pay the market wage that would employ all population in 
sector 1. 
Implicitly, and if  is related to probability of detection (and subsequent law 
enforcement) of non-compliance, we could link type-A solutions to cases where 
workers are sampled by the legal system, whereas type-B would correspond to firms 
being the subjects of the inspection sampling pool (the employment decision being 
made after the firm having been - or not - the target of inspection) 3. Even if Type-B 
would seem, in that sense, more adequate, that does not have to be the case: if detection 
comes from workers' complaint, or previous employment decisions by the firm are 
binding after detection, Type-A could be more appropriate. 
If one interprets  as degree of unionisation in sector 1, the two scenarios 
confront unionisation by, say, profession – Type A - with firm-level unionisation – 
Type B. 
 
. We always model a partially covered sector with some unemployment 
generating ability. That did (does) not have to be the case – and we might have the 
informal wage decreasing till all the labor force in the sector is employed.  
Technically, that would advise the departure from two different labor demands 
of the formal and informal sectors and the homogeneity – and randomness, on which 
the stochastic equilibrium relies - of employment chances in the partially covered 
sector would be lost. Otherwise, other correspondences had to be devised between the 
inverse demand and the appropriate argument to define the informal wage which would 
eventually complicate the analysis without gains in further insights. 
 
                                           
3 Type-B can be seen as in line with the assumptions about firm behavior of Ashenfelter and 
Smith (1979) and Grenier (1982), if the market wage W1(
_
;L1) in our equilibrium corresponds to 
the free market wage the firm faces in their structures - with full payment of the minimum wage if 
detection occurs. Chang and Ehrlich (1985) define a profit function on mean wage; hence, his 
assumptions would be in line with our type-A.  
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III. Degree of Coverage and Equilibrium in H.-T. Dualistic 
Models.
 
This section assesses the impact of a change in degree of coverage in a 
primary sector when a secondary sector is competitive – in sub-section i for Type-A 
equilibria, in ii for Type-B. Additionally, a contrast with the consequences of altering 
the formal wage is provided. 
 
i. Type - A Model. 
 
1. Consider the equilibrium described in Proposition 1. Take a change in the 
degree of coverage in sector/region 1. We have that: 
 
(60)     L;
_
1/ = - L;
_


























    =     [ W 1 - W1(L;
_


















It is a sufficient condition for this to be positive that: 
 













;W1) <  1 
 





;W1)' close to 1, and if 
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(62) W2(L;
_
2) =  
_
;W1 (1 - u1)  >  (1 - )  
_







1/ < 0 if | 1 |  > 1. 
Expected wage in the economy - equal to W2(L;
_









1 - will 
move in the same direction as L;
_
1. The wage bill in sector 2 will move in the same 
direction as W2(L;
_
2) - and of L;
_
1 -  iff  
 






2 ] <  1 
 
If | 2 | > 1, it will move in the same direction as  L;
_
2. 
As for mean wage in first sector: 
 
(64)   W;
_
1/ =  [W1 - W1(L;
_




1/  = 








1] /  

















The numerator is always positive. A sufficient condition for the denominator 




;W1)' close to 1, that (62) holds, 
i.e., if u1 < , mean wage in sector 1 increases with coverage. Neither are necessary 
conditions. Local employment will move in the opposite direction. As for 
unemployment in region 1 - and therefore, total unemployment:  
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(65)   U1/ = L;
_





















































;W1]} /  





















1)‘ close to 1, we 
can write: 
 
(66)   U1/  =  -  L1(
_
;W1)'  [W1 - W1(L;
_
1)]  

































When | 1 | > 1, the denominator is always larger than the numerator, because 
only a proportion (1 - ) of what is subtracted in the numerator is there a negative term. 
Then, if the denominator is negative, the denominator will be negative and U1/  > 0.  
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Also, when the numerator is positive, the denominator will be positive and, again, 
U1/  > 0.  
Then, (65) will only be negative when | 1 | > 1 and if de numerator is 
negative and the denominator is positive: for instance, if (62) holds and the numerator 
is negative: 
 








2]}  >  1 
 
Total employment will move in the opposite direction of U1. 
Finally, for local unemployment rate: 
 














2 =  
  = (1/ L;
_
1

































2. Consider an alternative policy measure: increase the wage in the partially 
covered sector, W1. 
 
(69)   L;
_
1/W1 = - L;
_






















;W1)']} =  
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Proposition 5: With incomplete coverage in one sector and a completely  
  uncovered sector and the internal equilibrium solutions described by: 
 [  W1 + (1 - ) W1(L;
_










  5.1. If | 1 | < 1, population will flow to the partially covered sector  
 when  coverage  increases. If | 1 | > 1 and u1 < , population will flow  
  away from the partially covered sector when coverage increases.  
  5.2. If | 1 | < 1 or u1 < , mean wage in the partially covered sector will  
  increase with coverage. Local unemployment rate will move in the same  
 direction. 
  5.3. Wage in the uncovered sector, expected wage in the economy and  
  total wage bill will move in the same direction as population in the  
  partially covered sector. Wage bill in the uncovered sector will move in  
  the same direction as population in the partially covered sector iff | 2 | 
<  
 1. 
  5.4. An increase in the partially covered sector institutional wage has the  
  same type of effect on the population flows as an increase in the degree  
 of  coverage. 
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ii. Type - B Model. 
 
1. Consider the equilibrium described in Proposition 3. Take a change in the 
degree of coverage in sector/region 1. We have that: 
 
(70)       L;
_
1/ = - L;
_




















The denominator of the expression is always positive, once W2(L;
_
2) =  W1 L1(W1) / L;
_
1 + (1 - ) W1(L;
_
1)  > (1 - ) W1(L;
_
1) for any interior 
solution. 
We may have that in the optimal solution either (45) occurs and in this case 
the numerator of (70) is positive - i.e., an increase of the degree of coverage in the first 
sector attracts supply to this sector.  
Or (46) holds, and then the numerator is negative. Intuitively, this means that 
chances of being employed become so low in the first sector when coverage increases, 
that people prefer to go to the second sector.  









1 - in the economy(ies) will move in 
the same direction  as  L;
_
1. The wage bill in sector 2 will move in the same direction 
as W2(L;
_
2) - and of L;
_
1 -  iff  
 






2 ] <  1 
 
If | 2 | > 1, it will move in the same direction as  L;
_
2. 
Employment in sector 1 will move according to: 
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(72)   L1
e /  = - [L;
_
1 - L1(W1)] + (1 - )  L;
_
1/  = 
   =  {[L;
_




2)‘ + (1 - ) W1(L;
_
1)‘]   - 




1 - L1(W1)] + (1 - ) [W1 - W1(L;
_
1)] L1(W1)}  
/ 






1]  - (1 - ) [W1(L;
_







(46) is a sufficient condition for this to be negative. Or that  = 1. But neither 
are necessary.  
As for unemployment, U = U1 = L;
_
1 - L1
e =  [L;
_
1 - L1(W1)]: 
 
(73)   U /  = [L;
_
1 - L1(W1)] +    L;
_
1/  = 
    = {- [L;
_




2)‘ + (1 - ) W1(L;
_
1)‘]   + 
 + [L;
_
1 - L1(W1)] [W2(L;
_
2) - (1 - ) W1(L;
_





1)] } / 






1]  - (1 - ) [W1(L;
_







This will likely be positive. A sufficient condition for it to be positive is that 
 = 0, or that (45) holds. As for local unemployment rate in the partially covered sector, 
u1 =  [L;
_
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1-L1(W1)] +   L;
_
1/ } - L;
_











1 - L1(W1)]+   L1(W1) L;
_




    = {- [L;
_
1 - L1(W1)] [ W2(L;
_
2)‘ + (1 - ) W1(L;
_
1)‘]   + 
    +      [W1 - W1(L;
_
1)]  L1(W1) / L;
_
1}  / 













1)‘] } > 0 
 
Given the definitions and the equilibrium condition,  
_
;W1 L 1
e =  W 1 

























(75)       
_












e 2 = 
   =  (1/L1
e 2) { [L;
_




1 +  













1/}  = 
   =  (1/L1












2)‘ { L1(W1) [W1 - W1(L;
_





L1(W1)]} +  
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1 - L1(W1)] ] /  






1]  - (1 - ) [W1(L;
_





} > 0 
 
 
2. Consider an alternative measure: increase the wage in the partially covered 
sector, W1. 
 
(76)   L;
_
1/W1 = - L;
_
2/W1 =   [L1(W1) + W1 L1(W1)']  / 






1]  - (1 - ) [W1(L;
_







One can see that an increase in the wage has now a different effect of 
increasing coverage. Now, people will flow to the covered sector with the covered 
sector wage iff  | 1 |  = - W1 L1(W1)' / L1(W1) <  1. 
 
 
Proposition 6: With incomplete coverage in one sector and a completely  
  uncovered sector and the internal equilibrium solutions described by: 
         W1 L1(W1) / L;
_













2), population will flow to the partially 
covered  






  flow away from the partially covered sector when coverage increases.  
  6.2. Local unemployment rate and mean wage paid to employees in the  
  partially covered sector will always increase with the degree of coverage. 
  6.3. Wage in the uncovered sector, expected wage in the economy and   
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  total wage bill will move in the same direction as population in the  
  partially covered sector. Wage bill in the uncovered sector will move in  
  the same direction as population in the partially covered sector iff | 2 | 
<  
 1. 
  6.4. An increase in the partially covered sector institutional wage will  
  lead to an increase of population in that sector iff | 1 | < 1. 
  
- 35 - 
IV. Degree of Coverage and Equilibrium in B.-H. Dualistic 
Models.
 
This section reproduces the exercises of section III for the Type-A and B 
generalizations of the B.-H. scenario – that is, we assume that the alien sector to the 
partially informal one is completely institutionalized. 
 
i. Type - A Model. 
 
1. Consider the equilibrium described in Proposition 2. Take a change in the 
degree of coverage in sector/region 1. We have that: 
 
(77)        L;
_
1/ = - L;
_
2/  = L;
_


























   =    L;
_
2 [W1 - W1(L;
_


















It is a sufficient condition for this to be positive, and expected wage, total 
wage bill, and wage bill in sector 1 - once wage bill in sector 2 is fixed - in the 
economy(ies) to increase with coverage, that: 
 













;W1) < 1 
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1)‘ close to 1, L;
_
1/ < 0 if: 
 

















As for mean wage in first sector: 
 
(80)   
_
;W1/  =  [W1 - W1(L;
_




1/  = 






;W1) + W2 L2]  / 





















;W1)' close to 
1, (79) holds, then mean wage in sector 1 increases with coverage. Neither are 
necessary conditions. Employment (local in sector 1 and total) will move in the 




1)‘ is close to 1: 
 






;W1/  =  [W1- W1(L;
_
1)] 
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close to 1 and: 
 














Notice that if (82) holds, (79) will hold necessarily. 
Finally, for local unemployment rate: 
 














2 =  



































This will increase with coverage if elasticity of demand in sector 1 is lower 




;W1)' close to one, if in the optimal 
solution (79) holds. 
 
2. With homogeneous wages - i.e., W1 = W2 = W - the conclusions will not be 
altered. 
 
3. Consider a change in wages. Then: 
 
(84)   L;
_
1/W1 = - L;
_









;W1)'] /  
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We can see that it will be positive or negative under the same conditions as 
L;
_
1/ is: If | 1 | < 1, L;
_




1)‘ close to 1, L;
_
1/W1 < 0 if (79) holds. Considering a change in the other sector's 
wage: 
 
(85)     L;
_
1/W2 = - L;
_
2/W2  =   -  L;
_
1 [L2(W2) + W2 L2(W2)'] / 

















When | 1 | < 1;  or | 1 | > 1 and (79) holds: L;
_
1/W2 > 0 iff | 2 | > 1 and 
L;
_
1/W2 < 0 iff  | 2 | < 1. 
As for a general wage increase in case of homogeneous coverage: 
 
(86)   L;
_
1/W = - L;
_










      -     L ;
_
1 [L2(W2) + W2 L2(W2)'] } / 
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L;
_
1 will decrease with the institutional wage if elasticity of demand in sector 




;W1)' close to one, if in 
the optimal solution (79) holds; and: 
 




1 (1 - | 1 |)  <  L2(W) / L;
_




(88)    W  (1 - | 1 |)  <  
_
;W1  (1 - | 2 |) 
 
As  W < 
_
;W1, this means that if  | 2 | < | 1 | < 1, then L;
_





;W1)' is close to one and in the optimal solution (79) holds, and if | 2 | 
> | 1 | > 1, then L;
_
1/W > 0. 
 
 
Proposition 7: With incomplete coverage in one sector and a completely  
  covered sector and the internal equilibrium solutions described by: 
 [  W1 + (1 - ) W1(L;
_




1 =  





  7.1. If | 1 | < 1, population will flow to the partially covered sector  
 when  coverage  increases. If | 1 | > 1 and u1 < (L;
_





  population will flow away from the partially covered sector when  
  coverage increases.  
  7.2. If | 1 | < 1 or u1 < (L;
_




, mean wage in the partially  
  covered sector will increase with coverage. 
  7.3. Expected wage in the economy, wage bill in the partially covered   
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  sector and total wage bill will move in the same direction as population  
  in the partially covered sector. 
  7.4. An increase in the partially covered sector institutional wage has the  
  same type of effect on the population flows as an increase in the degree  
 of  coverage. 
 
 
ii. Type - B Model. 
 
1. Consider the equilibrium described in Proposition 4. Take a change in the 
degree of coverage in sector/region 1. We have that: 
 
(89)   L;
_
1/  =  - L;
_
2/  =  L;
_






















The denominator of the expression is always positive. 
We may have that in the optimal solution either (49) occurs and in this case 
the numerator of (89) is positive - i.e., an increase of the degree of coverage in the first 
sector attracts supply to this sector. Expected wage in the economy - W2 L2(W2)/ L;
_
2 
-, as W2 L2(W2) is fixed, increases, and the unemployment rate in sector 2 decreases. 
Or (51) holds, and then the numerator is negative. Intuitively, this means that 
chances of being employed become so low in the first sector when coverage increases, 
that people prefer to go to the other sector. In this case, expected wage in the economy 
decreases with , and the unemployment rate in sector 2 increases, as local supply 
decreases in sector 1 and switches to sector 2.  
Consider the definition of effective employment (37): 
 
(90)   L1
e /  = - [L;
_
1 - L1(W1)] + (1 - ) L;
_
1/  = 
    =   { ( 1   -   )  L;
_




1)]  -  
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   -  [L;
_










    +   [ L ;
_






2 } / 
















A sufficient condition for this to be negative is that  = 1 or that (51) holds. 
But neither are necessary conditions. 













As for average wage in sector 1, 
_












(91)   
_




 {[ L 1(W1) L;
_












L1(W1)] } = 












1] [W1 - W1(L;
_








1 - L1(W1)]} 














2} > 0  
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As for local unemployment: 
 
(92)   U1/   =   L;
_
1/  - L1
e/  = 
    =     [ L ;
_
1 -  L1(W1)]  +    L;
_
1/  =  
  = { [L;
_
1 - L1(W1)] [ W1 L1(W1) L;
_
 /  L;
_




1]  + 
+  L;
_












2 } / 
















If  = 0 or (49) hods, this will be positive but it is not a necessary condition. 
As for local unemployment rate in region 1, u1 = U1/ L;
_
1, it will always 
increase with coverage: 
 
(93)   u1 /    =  { [L;
_
1 - L1(W1)] / L;
_
1} /   =  




1 -  L1(W1)] +    L1(W1) L;
_
1/ } /  L;
_
1 
2  =  










+   L1(W1) L;
_
2 [W1 - W1(L;
_
1)]  -  [L;
_






2 } /  
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2} > 0 
 
2. Consider that W1 = W2 = W. Then we may have either (56) or (58) and the 
general results above apply. 
 
3. Consider a change in the wage rates. Then, we have: 
 
(94)   L;
_
1/W1 = - L;
_
2/W1 = { L;
_
2  [L1(W1) + W1 L1(W1)']} / 
















If the wage elasticity of demand in sector 1 is smaller than one, then supply in 
sector 1 increases and in sector 2 decreases when W1 rises.  
 
(95)   L;
_
1/W2  =  - L;
_
2/W2 = - { L;
_
1  [L2(W2) + W2 L2(W2)'] 
} / 









2  - 






2}   =  - { L;
_
1  [L2(W2) + W2 L2(W2)'] } / 
















If the wage elasticity of demand in sector 2 is smaller than one, then supply in 
sector 1 decreases and in sector 2 increases when W2 rises.  
With homogeneous wages, and considering a general rise in the wage: 
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(96)   L;
_
1/W  =  - L;
_
2/W  =  
    = { L;
_
2  [L1(W) + W L1(W)'] - L;
_
1 [L2(W) + W L2(W)']} / 

















This will be negative, i.e., population will flow to region 2 when there is a 
general rise in the institutional wage, iff 
 
(97)     [L1(W)/ L;
_
1] (1 - | 1 |)  <  [L2(W)/ L;
_
2] (1 - | 2 |)     
 
This expression is similar to (87). As  L1(W) / L;
_
1 < L2(W) / L;
_
2, this 
means that if  | 2 | < | 1 | < 1, then L;
_
1/W < 0. If | 2 | > | 1 | > 1, then L;
_
1/W > 0. 
 
 
Proposition 8: With incomplete coverage in one sector and a completely  
  covered sector and the internal equilibrium solutions described by: 
    W1 L1(W1) / L;
_
1 +  (1 - ) W1(L;
_
1)  =  W2 L2(W2)/ L;
_
2 
  8.1. If W1(L;
_
1) < W1 L 1(W1)/ L;
_
1, population will flow to the 
partially  
  covered sector when coverage increases. If W1(L;
_
1) > W1 L1(W1)/ L;
_
1,  
  population will flow away from the partially covered sector when  
  coverage increases.  
  8.2. Local unemployment rate in the partially covered sector and mean  
  wage in this sector will always increase with the degree of coverage. 
  8.3. Expected wage in the economy, wage bill in the partially covered   
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  sector and total wage bill will move in the same direction as population  
  in the partially covered sector.  
  8.4. An increase in the partially covered sector institutional wage will  
  lead to an increase of population in that sector iff | 1 | < 1. 
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V. Possible Extensions.
 
. General findings should not change significantly if we assumed workers are 
expected utility rather than just expected income or wage maximizers – they do not 
seem to in many applications of the dualistic principle. That was the conclusion of 
Bhattacharya (1993) for his survey of rural-urban migration models. 
Say – as in Bhatia (1979), for example -, each individual enjoys utility u(Wi) 
when he earns wage Wi for certain; being pi the probability of employment and (1 – pi) 
of unemployment if in sector or region i, an individual decides his location maximizing 
pi u(Wi) + (1 – pi) u(0) – being u(0) the utility workers obtain when unemployed. In 
this case, the region’s wage bill is replaced by the aggregate sum of utilities of the 
individuals located in it in the equilibrium conditions of both H.-T. and B.-H. models, 
on the one hand. On the other, the wage elasticity of demand of sector i, i, is expected 
to be replaced in several of the relations by 
 
(98) [Li(Wi)’ / Li(Wi)]  [u(Wi) – u(0)] / u(Wi)’  
 
once that also happens when we simulate a change in the formal wage in those 
models. [u(Wi) – u(0)] / u(Wi)’ is known in the game-theoretical literature – see 
Svejnar (1986); also Martins (2004) – as “fear of disagreement”, assessing individual’s 
aversion to large risks. It measures how incremental utility is exchanged per marginal 
utility - that is, per incremental utility per unit of the argument, here, Wi. It is inversely 
connected to “boldness” – see Aumann and Kurz (1977) -, the semi-elasticity of the 
utility with respect to the argument. [u(Wi) – u(0)] / u(Wi)’ is the increase in wage 
required to generate a unitary proportional increase of the excess utility of employed 
workers relative to unemployed ones in the sector. 
One can manipulate (98) to generate: 
 
(99)  i  [u(Wi) – u(0)] / [u(Wi)’ Wi]  
 
i is divided by the elasticity of the spread in utilities available to individuals 
in sector i with respect to the wage – see Martins (1998) for an example of the role of 
the elasticity of individual’s utility with respect to the argument in cooperative game 
theory.  
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Hence, i should be replaced by the product of the wage-semi-elasticity of 
demand by fear of disagreement. Or by its ratio to the elasticity of the utility gain of 
employed relative to unemployed workers generated by an increase in the wage in 
sector i.  
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VI. Summary and Conclusions. 
 
1. The research was designed to analyze the effect of a change in the degree of 
coverage in a dualistic scenario. Two kinds of distinctions were considered: 
- one with respect to the equilibrium mechanism - Type A and Type B, the 
second more applicable to a higher degree of segregation between formal and informal 
work in the partially covered sector. For example, probability of detection (and law 
enforcement) may be seen as affecting workers in type A and affecting firms (once a 
firm is "detected" all its workers are paid the legal wage) in type B; or type A applies to 
a case where unionisation is structured by profession and type B to firm-level 
unionisation. 
- the other with respect to the wage setting arrangements in the other sector 
(i.e., the one in which coverage is not partial). 
The structures have in common the fact that expected wage in the partially 
covered sector is modelled in such a way that it corresponds, respectively, to the free 
market wage and the expected wage in a completely covered sector in corner solutions.  
Internal solutions of the four models considered require different relative 
magnitudes of the several wages in presence. Yet, wages of informal job holders are not 
necessarily lower than expectations of formal job ones, nor even of the other 
independent sector’s – whether the latter is totally covered or not at all; in some 
instances, conditions for informal wages to be relatively higher were related to a wage-
elasticity of the sector’s labor demand larger than 1. 
 
2. The impact on main macroeconomic aggregates of an increase in the degree 
of coverage were investigated. The sign effects are summarized in Tables 1, 1.1 and 
1.2. 
The increase in the degree of coverage, or probability of detection, will not 
increase necessarily the population installed in the partially covered sector - whatever 
the scenario considered. In Type A, that will occur if wage elasticity is lower than one 
in absolute value in the partially covered sector 4. In Type B, only if the wage paid to 
uncovered workers (e.g., illegal immigrants) of the partially covered sector is very low 
(at least, lower than the wage paid in the other sector).  
                                           
4 A low labor demand elasticity is found to increase the firms' incentive to comply in the 
partial equilibrium frameworks of both Grenier (1982) and Chang and Ehrlich (1985).  
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However, in a large number of situations, the increase in the degree of 
coverage will lead to a rise of the mean wage paid in the partially covered sector and its 
local unemployment rate. 
In equilibrium, the expected wage in the economy, the wage bill in the 
partially covered sector and total wage bill will move in the same direction as 
population installed in the partially covered sector. Therefore, it is not indifferent which 
is the type of equilibrium in presence. Nor will it always be convenient to increase law 
enforcement if aggregate well-being of the workers in the partially covered sector is the 
aim of minimum wage legislation. 
 
3. The increase in the degree of coverage may have a different impact in terms 
of sign than the increase in the institutional wage of the partially covered sector - they 
are confronted for population installed in the partially covered sector in Table 2 (for the 
cases where W1 = W2, the rise in the wage considered is simultaneous in both sectors, 
1 and 2). All depends in the way degree of coverage is enforced: the two policy 
measures will have the same sign effect in structures of Type A (an increase in either 
implying a rise in population in the partially covered sector if wage elasticity of 
demand in the sector is lower than unity in absolute value), when detection is made by 
worker sampling, but not in Type B, with firm sampling.  
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| 1 | > 1  










+  if 
| 1 | < 1; 
-  if 
| 
1 
| > 1 and 




















+ if  
| 1 | < 1; 
or | 
1 
| > 1  
 and  u1 <  
 
+ 
+  if 
| 
1 
| < 1; or 
| 1 | > 1 and 












- if  
| 1 | < 1; 
or | 
1 
| > 1  









or  = 1  
-  if 
| 
1 
| < 1; or 
| 1 | > 1 and 























+ if  










or  = 0 
+  if 
| 1 | < 1;   or 














or  = 0  
  




  Uncovered Sector  Multiple Coverage 
Variable  Type A  Type B  Type A  Type B 
 
u1  
+ if  
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+ 
+  if 
| 1 | < 1; or 
| 1 | > 1 and 















+  if 
| 1 | < 1; 
-  if 
| 1 | > 1  







+  if 
| 1 | < 1; 
-  if 
| 1 | > 1 and 





















-  if 
| 1 | < 1; 
+  if 
| 1 | > 1  










-  if 
| 
1 
| < 1; 
+  if 
| 1 | > 1 and 






















+  if 
| 1 | < 1; 
-  if 
| 
1 
| > 1  
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L2  
-  if 
| 
1 
| < 1; 
+  if 
| 1 | > 1  




















  Uncovered Sector  Multiple Coverage 











-  if 
| 1 | < 1; 
+  if 
| 
1 
| > 1 and 
























-  if 
| 
1 
| < 1; 
+  if 
| 1 | > 1 and 



















W2 L2  
+  iff 
(|1|-1)(|2|-1)>0
and  u1 <  when












x (1 - |2|)>0  






+  if 
| 1 | < 1; 
-  if 
| 1 | > 1  








+  if 
| 
1 
| < 1; 
-  if 
| 1 | > 1 and 



















1   




+ if  










or  = 0  
+  if 
| 
1 
| < 1; or 
| 1 | > 1 and 















or  = 1  
 
  






 Uncovered Sector  Multiple Coverage 
Change of:  Type A  Type B  Type A  Type A 
W1 = W2 
Type B  Type B 




+  if 
| 1 | < 1; 
-  if 
| 1 | > 1  










+  if 
| 1 | < 1; 
-  if 
| 
1 
| > 1 and 








+  if 
| 1 | < 1; 
-  if 
| 
1 
| > 1 and 



























+  if 
| 1 | < 1; 
-  if 
| 
1 
| > 1  
 and  u1 <  
 
 
+  iff 
| 1 | < 1 
+  if 
| 1 | < 1; 
-  if 
| 1 | > 1 and 








-  if 
| 2 |<| 1 |<1;
+  if 
| 2 |>| 1 |>1 
and 










+  iff 
| 1 | < 1 
-  if 
| 2 |<| 1 |<1;
+  if 













or | 1 | > 1 and








+ iff | 
2 
| > 1 
-  if 
| 2 |<| 1 |<1;

















+  iff 
| 
2 
| > 1 






+  if 
| 2 |>| 1 |>1
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